Compactly representing utility functions using weighted goals and the max aggregator  by Uckelman, Joel & Endriss, Ulle
Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 1222–1246Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Artiﬁcial Intelligence
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint
Compactly representing utility functions using weighted goals and
the max aggregator✩
Joel Uckelman ∗,1, Ulle Endriss
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 11 January 2010
Received in revised form 8 July 2010
Accepted 12 July 2010




Weighted propositional formulas can be used to model preferences over combinatorial
domains: each formula represents a goal we would like to see satisﬁed, the weight of a
formula represents the importance of the goal in question, and to assess the desirability of
a given alternative we aggregate the weights of the goals satisﬁed by that alternative. One
of several options is to aggregate by using the maximum of the weights of the satisﬁed
goals. This approach gives rise to a family of preference representation languages, one for
each of a range of possible restrictions we can impose on either formulas or weights. We
analyze the properties of these languages and establish results regarding their expressivity,
and absolute and relative succinctness. We also study the computational complexity of the
problem of ﬁnding the best and the worst alternative for a given set of weighted goals,
and of ﬁnding an alternative that is optimal for a group of agents, for a range of different
notions of collective optimality proposed in social choice theory and welfare economics.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation and background
Preference handling is a problem of central importance in Artiﬁcial Intelligence [3]. For example, recommender systems
need to elicit and maintain a representation of the user’s preferences and multiagent systems are often modeled as col-
lections of decision-theoretic agents, each of which are guided by their own preferences. Possibly the most fundamental
question in this context is how to best represent the preferences of an artiﬁcial agent or a human user. Designing suitable
languages for representing preferences is particularly challenging when the alternatives over which an agent expresses pref-
erences have a combinatorial structure. For example, in the context of combinatorial auctions [4] or other resource allocation
problems [5], the number of bundles of goods an agent may obtain is exponential in the number of goods under discussion,
so being able to express preferences over this exponentially large space of alternatives in a compact manner is crucial.
In this paper we study a particular family of languages for representing cardinal preferences over combinatorial domains
that are Cartesian products of several binary domains. Expressing a cardinal preference means specifying a (utility or valua-
tion) function mapping each alternative to a number reﬂecting the degree of preference for that alternative. For comparison,
ordinal preferences are relations over pairs of alternatives specifying whether one is preferable to the other. The use of utility
✩ This paper is based on and extends work presented at the 11th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning
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binatorial auctions, for instance, modeling preferences as utility functions is appropriate: in such an auction each bidder
needs to express how much they would be prepared to pay for a given bundle of goods [4]. From the representational point
of view, this amounts to specifying a function from the space of bundles to numbers, i.e., to specifying a cardinal preference
structure.
The family of preference representation languages we study is based on weighted propositional formulas, or weighted
goals. For a given set of propositional variables, alternatives correspond to models for propositional formulas. A utility
function mapping such alternatives to the reals can then be represented as a set of weighted goals, as follows: To compute
the utility of a given alternative X , we ﬁrst collect all the weights of the goals satisﬁed by X and then we aggregate those
weights to obtain a single number, the utility of X . One natural aggregation function is ; in this case, the utility of X is
the sum of the weights of the goals satisﬁed by X . An other option is to use the max operator; in this case the utility of X
is the maximum of the weights of the goals satisﬁed by X .
Using weighted formulas for preference representation is an idea which originated in penalty logic [6]. Penalty logic
addresses the problem of how to make inferences from an inconsistent knowledge base by augmenting the formulas in
a knowledge base with weights, which indicate the cost of falsifying the associated formula; then the inference problem
reduces to considering what is valid over only the minimal-cost consistent subsets of a given knowledge base. Here, costs are
summed: That is, the cost of rejecting ϕ and ψ is the sum of their weights. Lafage and Lang [7] generalize penalty logic to
permit aggregators other than sum, and also introduce a distance-based aggregator. Coste-Marquis et al. [8] take a different
approach: Rather than using goalbases directly for representing cardinal preferences, they use goalbases to underpin various
ordinal preference relations.
Chevaleyre et al. [9] shifted from considering the weights of unsatisﬁed formulas as penalties to considering the weights
of satisﬁed formulas as utilities, and their work contains initial results on goalbases aggregated with sum; later work extends
this to systematically cover most naturally-deﬁned sum-aggregated goalbase languages [10]. Recently, this framework has
been further extended from propositional logic to description logic [11,12].
1.2. Our contribution
As mentioned, most previous work has concentrated on the weights of unsatisﬁed goals or on sum languages, where
weights are aggregated via . In this paper we explore in depth the properties of the next most important family of
languages that can be constructed in this framework, namely the max languages, in which the aggregation function used is
max. The properties we study concern the expressivity, the succinctness, and the complexity of max languages.
Expressivity. We establish correspondence results which show what classes of utility functions can be represented by the
most natural representatives of the family of the max languages. For instance, if the only logical connective allowed is
conjunction, then we can represent the monotone utility functions, and only those.
Succinctness. We rank the most important max languages in terms of how compactly they can represent those utility
functions that they are able to represent. Informally, language L is at least as succinct as L′ if the increase in size when
translating representations from L′ to L is polynomially bounded. For instance, conjunctions of literals induce a strictly
more succinct language than conjunctions of atoms if only positive weights are permitted, but an equally succinct language
if both positive and negative weights can be used. We also provide results concerning bounds on the absolute succinct-
ness of some languages, and we study whether languages have unique or multiple representations for the same utility
function.
Complexity. We ﬁrst address two natural problems that arise in the context of reasoning about the preferences of a single
agent when these are represented using a max language. Here we study the computational complexity of (the decision
variants of) the problem of ﬁnding the highest and the lowest utility that such an agent may experience. It turns out
that the complexity strongly depends on the language chosen; some problems can be solved in linear time while others
are coNP-complete. We also study the complexity of collective utility maximization, the problem of ﬁnding the “best”
partitioning of the set of propositional variables amongst a group of agents (inducing a model for each of them). There are
a number of different ways of aggregating the utilities of the members of a group to deﬁne what is best for that group. We
analyze the complexity of the problem for several of the standard notions of collective utility, familiar from the social choice
and welfare economics literature, such as utilitarian social welfare, egalitarian social welfare, and the Nash product [13].
1.3. Related work
Similar questions have previously been addressed for other preference representation languages.
CP-nets [14] are a tool for representing conditional ordinal preferences over combinatorial domains (rather than utility
functions, on which we focus in this paper). As with any individual preference representation formalism, we may wish to
aggregate individual preferences into group preferences. Various methods for aggregating the CP-nets of multiple agents
have been tried by, e.g., Rossi et al. [15] and Lang and Xia [16]; the analogous problem for us, aggregating the goalbases of
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the CP-nets literature [17]; we do not study these questions for goalbases because ﬁnding the utility of a given model for
an agent is always computationally trivial.
Generalized additive (GA) decomposition is a way of representing utility functions as sums of “smaller” utility functions,
each of which has as its domain some proper subset of the domain of the larger utility function. Originally proposed by
Fishburn [18], GA-decomposition has more recently been used by Gonzales and Perny [19] for constructing GAI-nets, and by
Brafman et al. [20] for eliciting preferences using GA-decomposable CP- and TCP-nets. Goalbase languages may be seen as
particular way of GA-decomposing utility functions.
MC-nets [21] are a method of representing the utilities which accrue to coalitions of players in coalitional games. Ieong
and Shoham [21] consider the expressive power and succinctness of MC-nets, as well as the complexity of answering
questions about the core of the coalitional game being represented. MC-nets and the goalbase language L(cubes,R,)
(the language of arbitrarily-weighted conjunctions of literals, aggregated by summing weights of satisﬁed formulas) are
essentially notational variants of each other, applied to different problems. Elkind et al. [22] extend MC-nets to permit
arbitrary formulas and prove some succinctness and complexity results for these languages.
Bidding languages—cardinal preference representation languages designed for expressing the values of bundles of goods—
are a popular topic in the combinatorial auctions literature. The expressivity, succinctness, and complexity of the XOR and OR
bidding languages have been studied extensively [23]. The XOR language is equivalent to our language L(pcubes,R+,max)
(the language of positively-weighted conjunctions of atoms, aggregated by taking the maximum weight of all satisﬁed
formulas). Boutilier and Hoos [24] have proposed two logic-based bidding languages (which are in some respects similar to
our sum languages), and Boutilier [25] experimentally compared these two languages to see how their use affected runtime
when solving the Winner Determination Problem for auctions.
Coste-Marquis et al. [8] use goalbases to induce various kinds of preference orderings, prove expressivity results about
which preorders are expressible under which methods of constructing preorders from goalbases, and show whether it is
possible to translate the underlying goalbases from one language to another without exponential blowup. These results are
similar in concept to our succinctness results, though we view goalbases cardinally rather than ordinally.
1.4. Overview of this paper
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Basic deﬁnitions concerning the framework of representing utility
functions via weighted goals are provided in Section 2. Section 3 contains our expressivity results. Following some general
remarks on succinctness in Section 4, Section 5 presents results on absolute succinctness and the uniqueness property and
Section 6 is devoted to the issue of relative succinctness. Then, complexity results for reasoning about the preferences of
individual agents are provided in Section 7, while our results on the complexity of collective utility maximization can be
found in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes with a brief discussion of some of the remaining open problems in the area.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we present deﬁnitions and notation used throughout this paper, as well as our basic framework for
representing utility functions. First, we deﬁne the structures we need from propositional logic:
Deﬁnition 1 (Propositional formulas). The set PS is a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set of propositional variables. We write PSn to indicate
that |PS| = n. Let LPS be the language of propositional logic over PS and the logical constants  and ⊥, closed under
the Boolean connectives ¬, ∧, and ∨.
The technical results found here apply to formulas that contain only the connectives ¬, ∧, and ∨. We omit → (implica-
tion) as a Boolean connective because is it succinctly deﬁnable in terms of ¬ and ∨. Equivalence and XOR we also do not
consider here, though their inclusion might result in more succinct languages.2
Deﬁnition 2 (Propositional models). A model is a set M ⊆ PS . The satisfaction relation |
 for models and formulas is deﬁned
in the usual way for propositional logic:
M |
 . M |
 ¬ϕ iff M |
 ϕ.
M |
 ⊥. M |
 ϕ ∧ψ iff M |
 ϕ and M |
 ψ.
M |
 p iff p ∈ M. M |
 ϕ ∨ψ iff M |
 ϕ or M |
 ψ.
We give names to some types of propositional formulas:
2 The XOR we refer to here is logical XOR, which is distinct from the so-called XOR in XOR bidding languages [23] and valuative XOR [24], both of which
behave like max and operate on weights, rather than formulas.
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• An atom is a member of PS .
• A literal is an atom or its negation.
• A clause is a disjunction of literals.
• A cube is a conjunction of literals.
• A positive X is a satisﬁable formula of type X that contains no
negations.
• A strictly positive X is a non-tautologous positive X .
• A k-X is an X with at most k occurrences of atoms.
We abbreviate the class of general, unrestricted formulas to forms. When discussing positive clauses, positive cubes, and
positive formulas, we frequently abbreviate these to pclauses, pcubes, and pforms, respectively. Additionally, we call strictly
positive cubes and strictly positive formulas spcubes and spforms, respectively. (The term spclauses is redundant because
every positive clause is falsiﬁable.) Atoms are 1-spclauses, 1-spcubes, and 1-spformulas (and also 1-pclauses, 1-pcubes, and
1-pformulas), while literals are 1-clauses, 1-cubes, and 1-formulas. Clauses, cubes, and formulas are ω-clauses, ω-cubes, and
ω-formulas, respectively, which is to say that the formulas may be of any ﬁnite length.3 Note that by convention
∧∅ = 
and
∨∅ = ⊥, from which follows that  is the unique 0-pcube and ⊥ the unique 0-clause. The notation X +  indicates
the set of formulas X ∪ {} (e.g., pclauses+ is the set containing all pclauses along with ).
Deﬁnition 4 (State formulas). If X ⊆ PS , then deﬁne X¯ = PS \ X , and ¬X = {¬p | p ∈ X}. Then ∧(M ∪ ¬M¯) is the state
formula corresponding to the model M .
For example, if PS = {a,b, c,d}, then the state formula for the model ∅ is ¬a ∧ ¬b ∧ ¬c ∧ ¬d and for {a,b} is a ∧ b ∧
¬c ∧¬d. Notice that M ′ |
∧(M ∪¬M¯) iff M = M ′ .
We are interested in utility functions over combinatorial domains that are the Cartesian product of several binary do-
mains. A generic representation of this kind of domain is the set of all possible models for propositional formulas over a
ﬁxed language with a ﬁnite number of propositional variables (the dimensionality of the combinatorial domain).
Utility functions are a typical method for specifying cardinal preferences:
Deﬁnition 5 (Utility functions). A utility function is a mapping u : 2PS → R.
Because the utility functions we consider have sets as their domain, and propositional models are sets, utility functions
can be thought of as mapping models to their values.
We note here some properties of utility functions to which we make frequent reference:
Deﬁnition 6 (Properties of utility functions). Suppose that u is a utility function. Then:
• u is normalized iff u(∅) = 0.
• u is nonnegative iff u(X) 0 for all X .
• u is monotone iff u(X) u(Y ) for all X ⊇ Y .
• u is modular iff u(X ∪ Y ) = u(X)+ u(Y )− u(X ∩ Y ) for all X, Y .
• u is a unit-demand valuation iff u(X) =maxa∈X u({a}) and u is normalized.
• u is a simple unit-demand valuation iff u(X) = 1 for all X = ∅ and u is normalized.
Deﬁnition 7 (Weighted goals and goalbases). A weighted goal is a pair (ϕ,w), where ϕ is a formula in the language LPS and
w ∈ R. A goalbase is a ﬁnite multiset G = {(ϕi,wi)}i of weighted goals.
Goals are typically required to be satisﬁable formulas. We will see in Section 3 that for the languages studied here this
restriction does not affect expressive power, though the presence of unsatisﬁable formulas can affect the computational
complexity of some decision problems, as discussed in Section 7. When a particular goalbase is under consideration, we
write wϕ to mean the weight of formula ϕ in that goalbase. For(G) is the set of formulas in G . Var(ϕ) is the set of
propositional variables in the formula ϕ and Var(G) =⋃ϕ∈For(G) Var(ϕ). A formula (ϕ,wϕ) ∈ G is active in a model M
when M |
 ϕ and for all other (ψ,wψ) ∈ G such that M |
 ψ , wψ  wϕ .
Given a goalbase and a model, we may easily determine which weighted formulas the model makes true. Now, we would
like to combine the weights of the satisﬁed formulas to ﬁnd the value of the model. A function which combines weights
must map a multiset of reals (the collected weights of the satisﬁed formulas) to a real (the value of the model). We call such
functions aggregation functions, as they aggregate the many weights of satisﬁed formulas into the single value of the model.4
3 Strictly speaking, we should write, e.g., <ω-cubes instead of ω-cubes, but we abuse notation for the sake of brevity and because all formulas are
assumed to have ﬁnite length.
4 The deﬁnition of aggregation function given here differs subtly from that given elsewhere [7,10,26], in that all of these write the aggregation function
as F : 2R → R when in practice the reader is meant to understand the aggregation function as operating on multisets. In particular, these authors often
write sums of weights as
∑{w | stuff }, when what is intended is ∑stuff w . We have striven to avoid this ambiguity in the present work; in the event that
we have failed, please in all cases read sums of weights as sums of multisets (rather than sets) of weights. That is,
∑{1,1} = 2 = 1.
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mapping each model M ⊆ PS to uG,F (M) = F (w | (ϕ,w) ∈ G and M |
 ϕ).
Because multisets are unordered structures, any aggregation function will necessarily be associative and commutative
over weights.5 Natural aggregation functions to consider include  and max. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to the






In other words, the value of a model is the same as the largest weight had by any formula which is true in that model. For
example, if PS = {p,q, r}, then the goalbase G = {(,0), (p ∨ q ∨ r,1)} generates the utility function u : X → min(1, |X |).
(This is easy to see by observing that  is the only true formula in the model ∅, so it sets the value of uG there; both
 and p ∨ q ∨ r are true in every other model, but p ∨ q ∨ r has a higher weight, so it sets the value of uG in all models
except ∅.)
Different aggregation functions may produce dramatically different utility functions from the same goalbase. E.g., if G =
{(a,1) | a ∈ PS}, then uG,max is the simple unit-demand utility function (u(X) = 1 if X = ∅, 0 otherwise) while uG, is the
simple additive utility function (u(X) = |X |). We assume that max(∅) = −∞; it is often useful to include, say, (,0) in any
goalbase intended for use with max so as to obtain utility functions with ﬁnite values for all models.
Deﬁnition 9 (Goalbase equivalence). Two goalbases G and G ′ are equivalent with respect to an aggregation function F (writ-
ten G ≡F G ′) iff they deﬁne the same utility function. That is, G ≡F G ′ iff uG,F = uG ′,F .
Goalbases provide a framework for deﬁning languages for representing utility functions. Any restriction we might impose
on goals (e.g., we may only want to allow clauses as formulas) or weights (e.g., we may not want to allow negative weights)
and any choice we make regarding the aggregator F give rise to a different language. An interesting question, then, is
whether there are natural goalbase languages (deﬁned in terms of natural restrictions) such that the utility functions they
generate enjoy simple structural properties. (This is indeed the case, as seen in Section 3.)
Deﬁnition 10 (Languages and classes of utility functions). Let Φ ⊆ LPS be a set of formulas, W ⊆ R a set of weights, and F
an aggregation function. Then L(Φ,W , F ) is the set of all goalbases formed by formulas in Φ with weights from W to be
aggregated by F , and U(Φ,W , F ) is the class of utility functions generated by goalbases belonging to L(Φ,W , F ).
Regarding weights, we study the restriction to the positive reals (R+) as well as the general case (R). For complexity
questions we will restrict our attention to the rationals (Q). We restrict formulas by their structure, according to the types
of formula deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3. For example, the language L(cubes,R+,max) consists of all goalbases which contain
only positively-weighted cubes, and are aggregated using max. Many more examples of languages will be seen in Section 3,
where we investigate language expressivity.
Finally, a note on non-binary domains: Due to the applications we have in mind for goalbase languages, resource alloca-
tion, auctions, voting—all binary in the sense that an agent has an item or does not, or a candidate is a winner or not—we
have restricted our variables to have binary domains. Moreover, restriction to binary domains is a natural one when working
with propositional logic. Nonetheless, it is possible to simulate in our framework variables which take on a larger (but still
ﬁnite) set of values, by coding single many-valued variables into multiple binary-valued ones.
3. Expressivity
An important feature of any preference representation language is the range of preferences which can be represented in
it. This available range is known as the expressivity of the language; this section is devoted to determining the expressivity
of various max goalbase languages.
From the point of view of the theorist, we want to know how expressive goalbase languages are, both for their own
sake and because these expressivity results are necessary for proving succinctness results in Section 6. As a user of goalbase
languages, knowing the expressivity of goalbase languages can help us choose the language which is best suited for our
application. Can our language of choice represent all functions belonging to a given class of utility functions which interests
us? Not all languages are equally expressive and not all applications require full expressivity. Excess expressivity is often
undesirable, because highly expressive languages tend to be computationally more demanding to reason about.
We are interested in correspondence results between languages and classes of utility functions. A correspondence result
shows that the utility functions representable in a particular language are exactly those comprising a particular class of
5 If the domain were arbitrary-length tuples of reals instead of multisets of reals (R∗ instead of NR), then there could be aggregators which are sensitive
to the order in which formula weights are aggregated. Since goalbases are unordered structures, there is no compelling reason to be concerned with the
order in which weights are aggregated, so we limit the domains of aggregators to multisets.
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four.
We begin by establishing some simple results regarding equivalences between languages, which allow us to narrow the
range of languages to be considered in the remainder of the section. We then characterize the expressivity of the most
important (distinct) languages.
3.1. Goalbase equivalences
We are interested in comparing languages generated by different types of goalbases, in particular those generated from
the following restrictions on formulas: literals, cubes, clauses, and general formulas using both conjunction and disjunction; as
well as positive formulas and those including negation. Regarding weights, we want to consider positive and general weights.
This gives rise to 4 · 2 · 2 = 16 different languages. Here we establish several equivalences amongst languages and thereby
show that we actually only need to consider a subset of all the languages that can be deﬁned in this manner. Furthermore,
if we are interested only in monotone utility functions, then we can further reduce the range of languages to consider.
We ﬁrst show that disjunction is not an expressively helpful connective for max languages:
Theorem 11. G ∪ {(ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn,w)} ≡max G ∪ {(ϕi,w) | 1 i  n}.
Proof. Fix a model X . If wϕ1∨···∨ϕn is not the maximum wψ such that X |
 ψ , then some other (ψ,wψ) ∈ G is. Since
wϕi = wϕ1∨···∨ϕn , then wψ > wϕi for all i. In this case, G alone determines the value of the left and right goalbases.
If wϕ1∨···∨ϕn is the maximum wψ such that X |
 ψ , then some ϕi are such that X |
 ϕi . For each such ϕi , we have
wϕi = wϕ1∨···∨ϕn in the goalbase on the right, and so both the left and right have the same maximum. 
This tells us that with max as our aggregator, disjunctions as main connectives do not contribute to a language’s expres-
sivity. In fact, as any formula has an equivalent representation in disjunctive normal form, this tells us that disjunction can
never increase the expressive power of a max language. In particular, from Theorem 11 we get the following equivalences
between languages:
Corollary 12. Fix W ⊆ R. Then:
1. U(pclauses,W ,max) = U(atoms,W ,max),
2. U(clauses,W ,max) = U(literals,W ,max),
3. U(pforms,W ,max) = U(pcubes,W ,max),
4. U(forms,W ,max) = U(cubes,W ,max).
Proof. For U(forms,W ,max) = U(cubes,W ,max): Suppose that (ϕ,w) ∈ G . Without loss of generality, assume that ϕ =
ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψn is in DNF. By Theorem 11, we may replace (ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψn,w) by (ψ1,w), . . . , (ψn,w) and preserve goalbase
equivalence. Repeating this for each original formula in G converts G to the language L(cubes,W ,max), since each ψi is a
cube and the weights were left unchanged.
We use the same argument for each of the other cases, noting that the same transformation reduces a positive formula
(in DNF) to a set of positive cubes, a clause to a set of literals, and a positive clause to a set of atoms. 
The same is not true for sum languages. E.g., under summation clauses are more expressive than literals: For W = R,
clauses can express all utility functions, while literals can express only modular functions [10, Corollary 3.8]. For each of the
equivalences in Corollary 12, there is a set of weights W which violates it under summation.
Recall that a utility function u is called monotone if M ⊆ M ′ implies u(M) u(M ′). Monotonicity is a reasonable assump-
tion for many applications, in particular if propositional variables are interpreted as goods. Next we show that negation is
not a helpful operation in case we are only interested in modeling monotone functions.
Theorem 13. Fix G. Let X+ be a set of positive literals, and X− a set of negative literals, such that no atom appears in both. If










Proof. There are two cases to consider: models which are supersets of X+ , and models which are not.
• Write u for uG∪{(∧ X+∪X−,w)},max. In models M ⊇ X+ , we have that M |
∧ X+ . It must be the case that u(M)  w




X+ ∪ X−,w) cannot change the value
of model M , since the value in M is already at least w .





X+ ∪ X−,w) cannot change the value at M , as inactive formulas do not affect the value of a utility
function.
Therefore, in all models M we have that uG∪{(∧ X+∪X−,w)},max(M) = uG∪{(∧ X+,w)},max(M). 
The following result shows that we can further reduce the range of languages to consider if we limit ourselves to
monotone utility functions. It follows immediately from Theorem 13 and Corollary 12. (Recall that
∧∅ = .)
Corollary 14. Let Mono be the class of monotone utility functions. Fix W ⊆ R. Then:
1. U(clauses,W ,max)∩Mono= U(atoms+,W ,max)∩Mono.
2. U(forms,W ,max)∩Mono= U(pcubes,W ,max)∩Mono.
3.2. Correspondences
Corollary 12 tells us that the interesting languages, expressivity-wise, are those based on cubes, positive cubes, literals,
and atoms. We prove that cubes are expressively complete for the full range of utility functions and that positive cubes
correspond to the class of monotone functions:
Theorem 15. U(cubes,R,max) is the class of all utility functions.




) ∣∣ X ⊆ PS}.
Since the formulas are state formulas, and as such are mutually exclusive, exactly one weight will be active in each model,
and so u(X) = uG(X). 
Theorem 16. U(pcubes,R,max) is the class of monotone utility functions.
Proof. (⇒) Suppose that G ∈ U(pcubes,R,max) but uG is not monotone. So there are models M ⊂ M ′ such that uG(M ′) <
uG(M). Then there is a (ϕ,uG(M)) ∈ G which is active in M such that M |
 ϕ but M ′ |
 ϕ . Since M ′ ⊃ M , then there is some
a ∈ M ′ \ M for which ϕ |
 ¬a. Therefore, ϕ is not a positive formula, which contradicts the hypothesis that ϕ is a pcube.
(⇐) If u is monotone, then let G = {(∧ X,u(X)) | X ⊆ PS}. Note that for Y ⊆ X , u(Y ) = w∧ Y  w∧ X = u(X) follows
directly from the monotonicity of u. In model X , uG(X) =max{w∧ Y | Y ⊆ X} = w∧ X . Hence uG(X) = u(X). 
Theorem 17. U(atoms,R,max) is the class of unit-demand utility functions.
Proof. Suppose that u is a unit-demand valuation, which by deﬁnition means that u(X) = maxa∈X u({a}). Construct a G ∈






Conversely, suppose that G ∈ U(atoms,R,max), and note that the same series of equivalences holds. 
We are not aware of a property of utility functions referred to in the literature which would characterize U(literals,
R,max). The desired property is a generalization of the unit-demand valuation that also allows us to specify a value for not
receiving a particular item.
By restricting the set of weights W we can capture classes of utility functions with a particular range. For in-
stance, the class U(pcubes,R+,max), is the class of nonnegative monotone functions. This class is known to be equal to
U(pforms,R+,) [10, Corollary 3.12].6 This is a case where a syntactically simple language is more expressive with max
than with sum.
On the other hand, some very simple classes of utility functions are hard to capture in structurally simple languages using
max aggregation. For instance, recall that a utility function u is called modular iff u(M∪M ′) = u(M)+u(M ′)−u(M∩M ′) for
all M,M ′ ∈ 2PS . Modular functions are nicely captured by U(literals,R,) [10, Corollary 3.8]. However, there is no natural
6 To be precise, U(pcubes,R+,max) = U(pforms,R+,) over total functions only. Because the max languages can also express partially deﬁned
functions returning −∞ for some models while sum languages cannot, if we expand our consideration to partially-deﬁned utility functions, then
U(pcubes,R+,max) ⊃ U(pforms,R+,).
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restriction to formulas that would allow us to characterize the modular functions under max aggregation. On the contrary,
among the max languages considered here, only L(cubes,R,max) can express all modular functions, and this language is
so powerful that it can actually express all utility functions.
We use the fact that L(k-pcubes,R,max) misses some modular utility functions when k < |PS| to show that the ex-
pressivity of L(k-pcubes,W ,max) and L(k-cubes,W ,max) strictly increases with k:
Theorem 18. For all k > j,
1. U(k-pcubes,W ,max) ⊃ U(j-pcubes,W ,max), and
2. U(k-cubes,W ,max) ⊃ U(j-cubes,W ,max).
Proof. (1) The nonstrict part follows by inclusion. For the strict part, we show that L((k + 1)-pcubes,W ,max)\
U(k-pcubes,W ,max) is nonempty because it includes a family of modular utility functions: Suppose that u is mod-
ular and nonnegative, and at least k + 1 singleton models {p1}, . . . , {pk+1} have nonzero value. Then there is no
G ∈ L(k-pcubes,W ,max) such that u({p1, . . . , pk+1}) = uG({p1, . . . , pk+1}). This is the case because with max as our ag-
gregator uG({p1, . . . , pk+1}) would necessarily be the weight of some k-pcube and by assumption if X ⊂ {p1, . . . , pk+1}
then u(X) < u({p1, . . . , pk+1}). However, if u gives exactly k+ 1 singleton models nonzero value, then u is representable in
L((k+ 1)-pcubes,W ,max) by the goalbase{(∧
X,u(X)
) ∣∣ X ⊆ PS and |X | k+ 1}.
(2) The same modular utility functions missing from L(k-pcubes,W ,max) are missing from L(k-cubes,W ,max), due
to the fact that the addition of negation to the language is not helpful for representing monotone utility functions (see
Theorem 13). 
Our correspondence results are summarized in Fig. 1. In the ﬁgure, each node represents one language we examined,
and an arrow from one node to another indicates that the tail language is included in the head language. Within each node,
the expressivity of the language is given, according to the key below:
ω ω-additive (general) m monotone
+ nonnegative u unit-demand
‡ general unit-demand ⊂ proper subset of
Where ⊂ is indicated, the language represents a proper subset of the class of utility functions with the given properties. In
all other cases, the language represents exactly the class of utility functions with the given properties. The x-axis (increasing
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if wϕ  wψ then
if |
 ϕ → ψ then





Fig. 2. An algorithm for removing superﬂuous formulas from a goalbase G .
to the right) is the cubes axis, along which allowable cubes grow from length 1 up to ω; the y-axis (decreasing into the
page) is the positivity axis and has two steps: positive and general. Each language in the lower graph is a sublanguage of the
corresponding language with general weights in the upper graph, but we have omitted these arrows for clarity. Note that
several languages do not appear in the ﬁgure due to being expressively equivalent to some language which does appear
there. For max languages, this is due to the fact expressed in Corollary 12, namely that disjunction does not contribute
expressivity to max languages.
4. Succinctness: Terminological interlude
An important criterion for selecting one language over another for some application is, as mentioned previously, the size
of the representations of utility functions in that language. (Recall that this is why we seek to avoid explicit representations
of utility functions.) In the two sections following this one, we present both absolute and comparative notions of succinct-
ness, so that we can make precise claims about the eﬃciency of various goalbase languages. Before we can do that, however,
we require some terminology and deﬁnitions common to both types of succinctness.
For max languages, some weighted goals in a goalbase may never contribute to the utility of an alternative. Recall that a
formula (ϕ,wϕ) ∈ G is active in a model M when M |
 ϕ and for all other (ψ,wψ) ∈ G such that M |
 ψ , wψ  wϕ . Goal-
bases may sometimes contain formulas which fail to contribute value to the goalbase in any model. We call these formulas
superﬂuous. Equivalence is preserved if superﬂuous formulas are removed from a goalbase one at a time: If (ϕ,w) ∈ G is a
superﬂuous formula, then G ≡ G \ {(ϕ,w)}. However, removal of all superﬂuous formulas simultaneously is not necessarily
equivalence-preserving, and which formulas are superﬂuous must be reevaluated after any single formula is removed from
a goalbase. For example, all formulas in {(a,1), (¬¬a,1)} are superﬂuous under max; however, removing both produces the
empty goalbase, which is not equivalent to the original. For max languages, contradictions are always superﬂuous, but for
any other weighted formula (even formulas with zero weight) there is some max goalbase where it is not superﬂuous.
Fact 19. Fix (ϕ,wϕ) ∈ G, and the aggregator as max. Then, if (ϕ,wϕ) is superﬂuous, for every model M where (ϕ,wϕ) is active, the
set {(ψ,wψ) ∈ G | M |
 ψ and wψ is maximal} is not a singleton.
Since superﬂuous formulas are useless, they may be removed without harm. We can remove superﬂuous formulas from
any G ∈ L(forms,R,max) as in Fig. 2. Two aspects of this algorithm are signiﬁcant: First, we remove superﬂuous formulas
one at a time. Second, this algorithm is not eﬃcient, as it requires a quadratic number of calls to an unsat oracle; we
would like to do better than a coNP algorithm. In the previous section, we saw that the only max languages which are
(expressively) interesting are based on cubes. This fact greatly reduces the complexity of deciding whether a formula is
superﬂuous, since deciding whether one cube implies another is polynomial (see the proof of Theorem 60 for the algorithm).
Next, we note a useful fact relating superﬂuity to activity:
Fact 20. Under the max aggregator, if G contains no superﬂuous formulas then every (ϕ,w) ∈ G has a model in which it is uniquely
active.
Some goalbase languages have a unique way of expressing a given utility function, while others allow for several alter-
native representations. Here we make this notion of uniqueness precise:
Deﬁnition 21 (Unique representations). A utility function u is represented in a language L if there exists a goalbase G ∈ L
such that u = uG . A utility function u is uniquely represented (modulo formula equivalence) in a language L if, given a set
of formulas Φ containing one representative formula for each formula equivalence class in L (except ⊥), there is a unique
goalbase G such that For(G) ⊆ Φ , uG = u, and G contains no superﬂuous formulas. A language L is said to have unique
representations if every u represented in L is uniquely represented.
Any language which has unique representations can be thought of as minimal in the sense that any further restriction on
permissible weighted formulas will lead to a reduction in expressivity. Effectively this means that the set of representatives
of formula equivalence classes forms a minimal basis for the vector space in which the goalbases live.
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The size of a weighted goal (ϕ,w) is the length of ϕ plus the number of bits needed to store w (that is, logw bits). The
size of a goalbase G , written as size(G), is the sum of the sizes of the weighted goals in G .
Observe that the size of a goalbase may differ from its cardinality: If G = {(a ∧ b,1)}, then size(G) = 2 (or 3, if we are
not neglecting the bit used for storing the weight) while |G| = 1.
Deﬁnition 23. A goalbase G ∈ L(Φ,W , F ) is minimal if for all G ′ ∈ L(Φ,W , F ) such that G ′ ≡F G , size(G) size(G ′).
The diﬃculty of recognizing whether G is minimal, or of ﬁnding a G which is a minimal representative of some utility
function u, is strongly dependent on what L and u are. In the general case, formulas in a minimal goalbase will be pairwise
non-equivalent, but this is not a suﬃcient condition for minimality. For some languages (such as L(atoms,R,max)) and
some classes of utility functions (e.g., modular) we can detect minimality and generate minimal representations easily,
while for many richer languages how to do this is not obvious or unknown.
For max languages, in a minimal goalbase no formula is implied by any formula with a smaller or equal weight; for sum
languages, formulas in a minimal goalbase will be pairwise non-equivalent.
5. Absolute succinctness and uniqueness
In this section we ﬁnd (absolute) bounds on the sizes of goalbases for the two most expressive and useful max languages,
L(pcubes,R,max) and L(cubes,R,max). The bounds we derive here imply bounds for sublanguages of these as well, in-
cluding all max languages we consider in this paper. For L(pcubes,R,max) and its sublanguages, we calculate exact sizes
of goalbases; for L(cubes,R,max), we give upper and lower bounds which are sometimes tight—though for sublanguages
there is the possibility of tighter bounds. Along the way, we prove that L(pcubes,R,max) has unique representations.
The range of a utility function u (ranu)—that is, the set of values it may take on—strongly inﬂuences the size of repre-
sentations that utility function may have in any max language:
Theorem 24. For any goalbase G, |G| | ranuG,max|.
Proof. By deﬁnition, uG,max(X) =max{wϕ | X |
 ϕ}, so for every model X there must be some wϕ = u(X). 
While the size of the range of a utility function serves as a lower bound on the size of its representation in any max
language, there is no such relationship for sum languages: E.g., if G = {(ai,2i) | ai ∈ PS}, then uG, has a large range (every
value in 0, . . . ,2|PS| − 1) despite that G is itself small (using only |PS| atoms).









Here, | ranuGn | = 2 but |Gn| =
( n
n/2
)+ 1 is superpolynomial and Gn is minimal in L(pcubes,R+,max).
There is a clear connection between superﬂuity and goalbase minimality, namely that if G is a minimal goalbase for
a utility function u ∈ U(Φ,W ,max), then G contains no superﬂuous formulas. However, the converse does not hold for
L(forms,R,max): {(p,1), (¬p,1)} and {(,1)} represent the same utility function u(X) = 1, yet neither formula in the
larger goalbase is superﬂuous.
Recall from Deﬁnition 21 that a language can have unique representations, meaning that it is suﬃciently restrictive
as to have exactly one minimal representation of each representable utility function. Several sum languages have unique
representations, as discussed in [2, Section 3.4.2] and [10, Section 3.2]. This also occurs for at least one max language:
Theorem 25. L(pcubes,R,max) has unique representations.
Proof. Fix u ∈ U(pcubes,R,max). Let G0 = ∅. While uGi ,max = u: Choose a least model X for which uGi ,max(X) = u(X). (By
least, we mean that |X | is minimal.) Let Gi+1 = Gi ∪ {(∧ X,u(X))}. Call G the Gi at which this algorithm terminates. (An
example of a run of this algorithm appears after this proof.)
Correctness: uG,max = u because each iteration ends with one more model correct than in the previous iteration, and
there are ﬁnitely many models. Setting a weight for
∧
X cannot disturb the value of any model Y ⊂ X , as X is the least
model where
∧
X is true, and cannot prevent us from correctly setting the value of any model Z ⊃ X during subsequent
iterations, because by Theorem 16 u is monotone. Note also that the order of choice of cubes of the same size makes no
difference in the outcome.
Minimality: For any model X , either
∧
X receives a weight or not. If
∧
X receives a weight, then there is no model
Y ⊂ X for which (∧ Y ,u(Y )) dominates (∧ X,u(X)). (A formula (ψ,wψ) ∈ G dominates another (ϕ,wϕ) ∈ G if ϕ |
 ψ and
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no model Z ⊃ X for which X |
∧ Z . Hence, if the algorithm assigns a weight to ∧ X , then this is the sole way in which
we can make uG,max(X) = u(X). If, on the other hand, the algorithm produces a G where ∧ X receives no weight, then at
some step i in the construction uGi ,max(X) became correct before we reached model X . If we were to set a weight for
∧
X ,
it would be superﬂuous and so G would not be minimal. In summary: Any smaller G will give an incorrect value for some
model, and any different, yet still correct, G will necessarily contain a superﬂuous formula. 
We give an example of run of the algorithm used in the proof above: Given the utility function
u(∅) = 0, u({b})= 0, u({a,b})= 2, u({b, c})= 3,
u
({a})= 1, u({c})= 2, u({a, c})= 2, u({a,b, c})= 10,
the algorithm constructs the corresponding goalbase G as follows: G0 = ∅ by deﬁnition. uG0,max(∅) = −∞ = u(∅) = 0, and∅ is the unique smallest incorrect model, so we let G1 = G0 ∪ {(,0)}. Now {a} and {c} are the least models made incorrect
by uG1,max; we choose to correct {a} ﬁrst. (Recall that the order in which models of the same size are corrected does not
affect the result.) Let G2 = G1 ∪{(a,1)}. Continuing in this fashion, we will correct the models {c}, {a,b}, {b, c}, and {a,b, c}:




, G4 = G3 ∪
{
(a∧ b,2)}, G6 = G5 ∪ {(a∧ b ∧ c,10)}.
G1 = G0 ∪
{
(,0)}, G3 = G2 ∪ {(c,2)}, G5 = G4 ∪ {(b ∧ c,3)},
After constructing G6, we see that there are no further incorrect models, i.e., uG6,max(X) = u(X) for all X ⊆ PS , so G = G6
is the unique representation of u in L(pcubes,R,max).
Note that while this algorithm does show how to construct the minimal representation for any representable utility func-
tion in L(pcubes,W ,max), it is not an eﬃcient algorithm for ﬁnding representations, as it requires us to check exponentially
many models in order to set weights for them.
Next, we derive upper and lower bounds for the size of representations in L(cubes,W ,max), but ﬁrst we prove several
technical lemmas which we will need. For the remainder of this section, we assume that all uG,max are total. First, recall
that active formulas in max-aggregated goalbases are those which have a weight equal to the value of some model where
they are true.
Lemma 26. Fix a goalbase G ∈ L(cubes,W ,max) and a (ϕ,w) ∈ G. If a model X has an extension Y ⊃ X such that uG,max(Y ) <
uG,max(X) and (ϕ,w) is active in X, then ϕ is not a positive cube.
Proof. Suppose otherwise. Let (ϕ,w) be such that X |
 ϕ , uG,max(X) = w , ϕ a pcube, and uG,max(Y ) < uG,max(X). Then for
all Y ⊃ X it follows that Y |
 ϕ because ϕ is a monotone formula. So uG,max(Y ) w = uG,max(X), contrary to hypothesis. 
In words: If a cube is active in a model which can decline in value when extended, then there must be a negative literal
in that cube.
Here we deﬁne the X↑ notation for denoting the set of extensions of X , which is used throughout the remainder of this
section:
Deﬁnition 27 (Upsets). If X is a model, then X↑ = {Y | X ⊆ Y ⊆ PS}.
The set of models 2PS may be thought of as a Boolean lattice; then X↑ is the sublattice rooted at X . Alternatively, X↑
may be thought of as all of the ways of extending X .
Lemma 28. Suppose that w is the minimum value of any model in X↑. Let (ϕ1,w), . . . , (ϕk,w) ∈ G ∈ L(cubes,W ,max) be the
formulas which are true in at least onemodel in X↑, false outside of X↑, and have weight w. Let G ′ = G \{(ϕi,w)}1ik∪{(∧ X,w)}.
Then:
1. G ′ ≡max G.
2. size(G ′) size(G).
Proof. For 1, we must show that the changes made to G to get G ′ result in no models being disturbed from their original
values. The formula
∧
X is true exactly in X↑ and nowhere else, so it disturbs no models outside of X↑. Adding (∧ X,w)
disturbs no models in X↑, since (∧ X,w) is inactive in any Y where u(Y ) > w , and provides the correct value in the
remaining models in X↑ since w is minimal there. Every ϕi |
∧ X , so if M |
 ϕi then M |
∧ X also, which covers all
models where a ϕi was active.
For 2:
∧
X is not longer than ϕ1, . . . , ϕk:
∧
X is the shortest formula which is true only in X↑. Each ϕi is true only in
X↑ also, so size(ϕi) size(∧ X), and therefore ∑ki=1 size(ϕi) size(∧ X) (strictly larger if k > 1). 
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smallest sublattice X↑ of Gi to which it has not yet been applied, and let the result be Gi+1. (Starting from the smallest
sublattice means starting with PS as the root and working our way downwards to ∅.) At some stage i, we will reach a ﬁxed
point—that is, Gi = G∞—where no further applications of the reduction will have any effect. (The upper bound for reaching
a ﬁxed point happens to be i = 2|PS| , though all we require here is that it happens after ﬁnitely many applications of the
reduction.) Let G ′ = G∞ , and call such a G ′ pcubes-minimal.
Since this reduction is never size-increasing, we may make use of it to observe a useful fact about the formulas in
minimal goalbases in L(cubes,W ,max):
Lemma 29. For every G ∈ L(cubes,W ,max), there is a minimal G ′ ≡max G such that (∧ X,w) ∈ G ′ iff w = minZ∈X↑ u(Z) and
u(Y ) < w for every Y ⊂ X.
Proof. Suppose that G ′′ ≡max G and G ′′ is minimal. Let G ′ be the result of exhaustively applying the reduction in Lemma 28
to G ′′ . Since the reduction is equivalence-preserving and size-reducing, G ′ ≡max G ′′ and size(G ′)  size(G ′′). Since G ′′ was
already minimal, G ′ cannot be smaller, so size(G ′) = size(G ′′) and G ′ is also minimal.
(⇒) Suppose that (∧ X,w) ∈ G ′ . Then (∧ X,w) was not eliminated by the reduction. Since ∧ X is a positive cube, it
is true exactly in X↑ and nowhere else. If there were some model Y ⊂ X for which u(Y )  w , then the reduction would
have eliminated (
∧
X,w) and replaced it with (
∧
Y ,w) instead, so it must be the case that u(Y ) < w for all Y ⊂ X . For
the other condition, suppose that there is a model Z ∈ X↑ such that u(Z) < w . Since Z |
∧ X and max is our aggregator,
it follows that u(Z) w , which is a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose that w = minZ∈X↑ u(Z) and u(Y ) < w for every Y ⊂ X . Since w is the minimal model value in X↑, it
follows that there is a model Z ⊇ X for which u(Z) = w . In order for u(Z) = w , we need a formula (ϕ,w) ∈ G ′ such that
Z |
 ϕ . Because u(Y ) < w for all Y ⊂ X , it must also be the case that Y |
 ϕ for all Y ⊂ X . The only formula which meets
both of these requirements which could have survived the reduction is (
∧
X,w), since any longer formula would have been
replaced by (
∧
X,w) and any shorter formula would either be true in some model Y ⊂ X or fail to be true in Z . 




2 if X = ∅,
1 otherwise,
then over PS = {p,q} the goalbase {(,1), (¬p ∧ ¬q,2)} represents u in the language L(cubes,R,max) and is pcubes-
minimal, yet the minimal weight in ∅↑, which is 1, does not equal u(∅) = 2.
Lemma 29 is crucial for the bounds we will derive below, as it tells us exactly which positive cubes we will ﬁnd in a
minimal goalbase which is also pcubes-minimal.
Furthermore, from Lemma 29, we have the following special case:
Lemma 30. For every G ∈ L(cubes,W ,max), there is a minimal G ′ ≡max G such that (,minX∈2PS u(X)) ∈ G ′ .
Proof. minX∈2PS u(X) =minZ∈∅↑ u(Z), and ∅ has no proper subsets. 
It is not always that case that a G ′ which results from the reduction under discussion is uniquely minimal. E.g.,
u(X) =
{
1 if a ∈ X,
0 otherwise
can be represented as either {(,0), (a,1)} or {(¬a,0), (a,1)}, which are the same size.
Now we attempt to calculate bounds on size(G) when G ∈ L(cubes,W ,max).




















)=∑{max(1, |X |) ∣∣¬∃Y ⊂ X s.t. uG,max(Y ) min uG,max(Z)}.Z∈X↑
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Using this and a result from Section 3, we can derive the exact size for every minimal G in the monotone portion of
L(cubes,W ,max):





1, |X |) ∣∣¬∃Y ⊂ X s.t. uG,max(Y ) uG,max(X)}.
Proof. Since uG,max is monotone, we know by Theorem 13 that removal of negative literals is equivalence-preserving. Since
G is minimal, it follows that the negative literals are already gone, so every formula in G is a positive cube. Hence G = G+ ,









Finally, notice that because uG,max is monotone, minZ∈X↑ uG,max(Z) = uG,max(X), which permits us to simplify the condi-
tion. 
Now we turn to the case where uG,max is nonmonotone. For any such minimal G , we know by Lemma 31 the precise
size of G+ , the positive subset of G , so all that remains is to derive bounds for G− , the subset of G containing negative
literals. First, we derive bounds for the size of G− .
Lemma 33. Let G ∈ L(cubes,W ,max) be minimal. Let G− be the set of cubes in G containing negative literals. Then∣∣{p ∈ PS ∣∣ uG,max(X) > uG,max(X ∪ {p})}∣∣ size(G−) |PS| · ∣∣∣{X |∃Y ⊂ X s.t. u(Y ) min
Z∈X↑u(Z)
}∣∣∣.
Proof. By Lemma 26, if there are models X and X ∪ {p} where uG,max(X ∪ {p}) < uG,max(X), then there must be a formula
(ϕ,w) active in model X that contains ¬p. These are the formulas which comprise G− .
The best case is that every such ¬p appears in G− exactly once, which gives us the lower bound. The worst case is to
write a state formula
∧
X ∪ ¬ X¯ to cover each pair of model X, X ∪ {p} over which there is a decline in value; every such
state formula has length |PS|. 
Now we have all of the pieces necessary for exhibiting upper and lower bounds on the size of goalbases in
L(cubes,W ,max) which represent nonmonotone utility functions.





1, |X |) ∣∣¬∃Y ⊂ X s.t. uG,max(Y ) min
Z∈X↑uG,max(Z)
}
+ ∣∣{a ∈ PS ∣∣ uG,max(X) > uG,max(X ∪ {a})}∣∣.
Proof. Recall that G = G+ ∪ G− . Lemma 31 gives us the exact size of G+ , while Lemma 33 gives us a lower bound for the
size of G− . 









∣∣∣{X ∣∣ ∃Y ⊂ X s.t. uG,max(Y ) min
Z∈X↑uG,max(Z)
}∣∣∣.
Proof. Recall that G = G+ ∪ G− . Lemma 31 gives us the exact size of G+ , while Lemma 33 gives us an upper bound for the
size of G− . 
Note that neither the upper nor lower bounds given here are tight in general, though for each bound we do have an
example of a goalbase for which one of the bounds is tight. For the upper bound, consider the utility function
u(X) = |X | mod 2,
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(,0), (a ∧ b ∧ c,1), (a ∧¬b ∧¬c,1), (¬a ∧ b ∧¬c,1), (¬a ∧¬b ∧ c,1)}
is minimal for u(X). The lower bound here is 7, the upper bound is 13, and the actual size is also 13. For the lower bound,
consider the utility function
u(X) =
{
1 if a /∈ X,
0 otherwise,
for which the goalbase {(,0), (¬a,1)} is minimal over PS = {a,b, c}. In this case, both the actual size and lower bound
are 2, while the upper bound is again 13. Finally, the utility function u(X) = 3 − |X | is represented minimally over PS =








which has size 16, but hits neither the lower nor the upper bound, which are 4 and 22, respectively.
Clearly these bounds could be reﬁned by further analyzing the composition of G− for various nonmonotone utility
functions, but at present what exactly the differences are among the three examples—what causes one to hit the lower
bound, one to hit the upper bound, and one to hit neither—is not apparent to us. Furthermore, the bounds themselves are
not easy to compute; here again, some additional insight into the structure of such functions might be of use. We leave
these issues for future work.
6. Relative succinctness
Frequently one language contains shorter representations of some utility functions than another language does. Here we
give a deﬁnition of relative succinctness (used also in [10] and similar to those given in [8,27]) to make this notion precise.
Because we wish to compare languages which differ in expressive power, we deﬁne succinctness over only the expressive
overlap of the languages being compared. This leads to some counterintuitive results for languages with little expressive
overlap and makes the comparative succinctness relation intransitive, but it also permits us to make comparisons where the
expressive overlap is substantial, though not total.
Deﬁnition 36 (Relative succinctness). Let L(Φ,W , F ) and L(Ψ,W ′, F ′) be goalbase languages and U a class of utility func-
tions for which every member is expressible in both languages. Then L(Φ,W , F ) U L(Ψ,W ′, F ′) iff there exists a function
f :L(Φ,W , F ) → L(Ψ,W ′, F ′) and a polynomial p such that for all G ∈ L(Φ,W , F ), if uG,F ∈ U then uG,F = u f (G),F ′ and
size( f (G)) p(size(G)).
Read L U L′ as: L′ is at least as succinct as L over the class U . When L′ is strictly more succinct than L—that
is, in no case are representations more than polynomially worse, and in at least one case, they are super-polynomially
better in L′—we write L ≺U L′ . When we have nonstrict succinctness in both directions, we write L ∼U L′; when we have
nonstrict succinctness in neither direction, i.e., incomparability, we write L ⊥U L′ . Whenever a succinctness relation appears
unsubscripted (i.e., without an explicit class of comparison), then implicitly U = {uG,F | G ∈ L} ∩ {uG ′,F ′ | G ′ ∈ L′}, which is
the expressive intersection of L and L′ . Later, in Section 6.2, we illustrate some circumstances in which being explicit about
the class of comparison is important.
Finding the succinctness relation between some pairs of goalbase languages is trivial, as when one language in a pair is
a sublanguage of the other, or when the two languages have no expressive overlap. These cases can be dismissed without
argument. Recall from Deﬁnition 21 that a goalbase language may have unique representations: If a utility function is
representable in the language, then there is exactly one representation of it in the language. If L has unique representations
and L  L′ is true, then we can show that L  L′ as follows:
Proof strategy. We present a family of utility functions U , and construct a (smallish, but not necessarily optimal) repre-
sentation G ′u ∈ L′ for each u ∈ U . Then, we construct a representation Gu ∈ L for each u ∈ U where at least one Gu is
exponentially larger than its corresponding G ′u . Because we know that L has unique representations, we know that we
cannot ﬁnd a smaller (or any other!) representation of u in L, so we have shown that L  L′ . 
This is a handy proof strategy, one which we shall make use of in the proofs of Theorems 42, 50, and 51.
Often we consider families of utility functions {un}n∈N , where for each n we have that |PS| = n. Suppose that we have a
corresponding family of goalbases {Gn}n∈N for which un = uGn . Unless the number of bits required to represent the weights
in Gn grows superexponentially in n, the size contributed by the weights can be safely ignored when considering how
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disregard the size of the weights in our succinctness results. (Superexponential growth in weights affects all languages
equally.)
Here we state some basic properties of the succinctness relation, which we use frequently in our proofs, often without
reference.
Fact 37. For all languages L1 , L2 , L3:
1. If L1 ⊆ L2 , then L1  L2 .
2. If L1  L2 and L3 ⊆ L1 , then L3  L2 .
3. If L1 ⊆ L2 ⊆ L3 and L1 ≺ L2  L3 , then L1 ≺ L3 .
Note that Fact 37.2 is useful contrapositively also, for deriving  results for superlanguages. For Fact 37.3, it would be
inadequate to require that L1  L2 ≺ L3 instead, since it could happen that L1 is too small to represent the utility functions
which cause L2 ≺ L3.
For certain languages, due to the limited length of formulas which may appear in minimal goalbases, it will be the case
that we need not distinguish between growth of size(G) and growth of |G|.
Lemma 38. Let L be a goalbase language. For each n ∈ N, let ϕn be the longest formula in L in n variables with no shorter equivalent.
Then if there is a polynomial p such that size(ϕn) ∈ O (p(n)), it follows that for all families of minimal goalbases {Gn}n∈N ⊆ L, size(Gn)
is polynomial in n iff |Gn| is polynomial in n.
Proof. (⇒) This direction is immediate, since it is impossible to form exponentially many formulas from polynomially-many
atom instances.
(⇐) Suppose that |Gn| = p(n) is a polynomial. The longest formula ϕn in L in n variables has size(ϕn) = q(n), for some
polynomial q. The worst case is that each of the p(n) formulas in Gn has size q(n), for a total size of p(n) · q(n), which is
still polynomial in n. 
In particular, this means that size(G) and |G| are interchangeable in terms of growth in |PS| for languages such as
L(cubes,W , F ) and L(clauses,W , F ), but not necessarily for languages such as L(forms,W , F ). We use this lemma implicitly
in several of our relative succinctness results.
Now we derive a simple succinctness result which applies to all languages which permit formulas of no more than a
ﬁxed, ﬁnite length.
Theorem 39. For any ﬁxed k ∈ N, arbitrary set of formulas Ψ , and arbitrary sets of weights W ,W ′ and aggregator F : If Φ ⊆ k-forms,
then L(Φ,W , F )  L(Ψ,W ′, F ).
Proof. There are only O (nk) formulas of length k or less, and so any utility function u representable in L(Φ,W , F )
cannot have a representation more than polynomially larger than the best one in L(forms,R, F ). Hence, L(Φ,W , F ) 
L(forms,R, F ). Furthermore, L(forms,R, F ) ⊇ L(Ψ,W ′, F ), so by Fact 37.2 we have that L(Φ,W , F )  L(Ψ,W ′, F ). 
As a consequence, any two languages with bounded-length formulas and the same aggregator are equally succinct over
their expressive intersection. Put another way, there are no interesting questions involving relative succinctness between
pairs of languages in which both impose a ﬁxed bound on formula length.
When comparing the succinctness of any two max languages, notice that the available weights play no role in the out-
come. If L(Φ,W ,max) and L(Ψ,W ′,max) are the languages under comparison, then for any utility function u representable
in both languages, ranu ⊆ W ∩W ′ . Due to this, any weighted formula (ϕ,w) where w /∈ W ∩W ′ will be superﬂuous when
it occurs in a representation of u in either language. Since only minimal representations are relevant for succinctness, we
can disregard all representations of u which use weights outside of W ∩ W ′:
Fact 40. For succinctness relations  ∈ {,≺,∼,⊥}:
L(Φ,W ,max) L(Ψ,W ′,max) ⇐⇒ L(Φ,W ∩ W ′,max) L(Ψ,W ∩ W ′,max).
6.1. Succinctness between max languages
Next, we show that all pcubes and cubes languages are equally succinct when using max for our aggregator.
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1. L(j-pcubes,W ,max) ∼ L(k-pcubes,W ′,max).
2. L(j-pcubes,W ,max) ∼ L(k-cubes,W ′,max).
3. L(j-cubes,W ,max) ∼ L(k-cubes,W ′,max).
Proof. When at least one of j,k ∈ N, all three cases follow immediately from Theorem 39. We must give a proof
when j = k = ω, but here the ﬁrst and third cases trivialize, so all that remains is to show that L(pcubes,W ,max) ∼
L(cubes,W ′,max). By Fact 40, we may assume without loss of generality that W = W ′ . L(pcubes,W ,max) expresses only
monotone utility functions, and Theorem 13 ensures that any representation containing negative literals may be reduced
to a shorter, equivalent one by simply deleting the negative literals; the result of such a deletion is in L(pcubes,W ,max).
Hence the minimal representations for any u representable in both L(pcubes,W ,max) and L(cubes,W ′,max) will be the
same, which proves that L(pcubes,W ,max) ∼ L(cubes,W ′,max). 
Recall that Theorem 11 shows that disjunctions as main connectives do not affect succinctness, because the translation
required to eliminate disjunction does not affect the size of a goalbase. However, the same is not necessarily true for
disjunctions which occur within the scope of other connectives. Therefore, for our analysis of expressivity of max languages
in Section 3 we could safely ignore disjunction, but for succinctness we cannot, as the next result demonstrates.
Theorem 42. L(pcubes,R+,max) ≺ L(pforms,R+,max).
Proof. We have that L(pcubes,R+,max)  L(pforms,R+,max) because every pcube is a positive formula. For strict suc-
cinctness: The family of utility functions represented by{(
(p1 ∨ p2)∧ (p3 ∨ p4)∧ · · · ∧ (pn−1 ∨ pn),1
)}
in L(pforms,R+,max) grows linearly with n. The same family may be represented in L(pcubes,R+,max) by{( n/2∧
k=1
pik ,1
) ∣∣∣∣ i1, . . . , in/2 ∈ {1,2} × {3,4} × · · · × {n− 1,n}
}
which has size 2n−1 for any (even) n. By Theorem 25, L(pcubes,R+,max) has unique representations, which establishes the
minimality of this representation. 
More generally, the same argument shows that for any intersecting sets of weights W ,W ′ , L(pcubes,W ,max) ≺
L(pforms,W ′,max)—so long as there is some w ∈ W ∩ W ′ , we may use that for the formula weights instead of using 1 as
we do in the proof—and also that L(pcubes,W ,max) ≺ L(forms,W ,max) and L(cubes,W ,max) ≺ L(pforms,W ,max), by
virtue of Theorem 13.
When dealing with negation-containing goalbases for monotone utility functions, we might wish to put all nonpositive
formulas in a standard form in order to simplify working with them. Negation normal form is a way of doing this. A formula
ϕ is in negation normal form (NNF) if all occurrences of negation apply to atoms only. Any formula may be rewritten to an
equivalent formula in NNF without an increase in size, by recursive application of De Morgan’s Laws and elimination of
double negation.
Before proceeding, we deﬁne a notion of uniform substitution for formulas and goalbases:
Deﬁnition 43 (Uniform substitution). If ϕ,ψ1, . . . ,ψk are formulas and p1, . . . , pk ∈ PS , then ϕ[ψ1/p1, . . . ,ψk/pk] is the
result of (simultaneously) substituting ψi for every occurrence of pi in ϕ . If G is a goalbase, then G[ψ1/p1, . . . ,ψk/pk] is
the result of applying the substitution to each (ϕ,w) ∈ G .
In the following, we will abuse notation by writing ϕ[/¬p] for the less perspicuous ϕ[⊥/p]. Once we have all formulas
in a monotone max goalbase translated to NNF, we may apply the following equivalence in order to remove the negative
literals altogether:
Lemma 44. If uG,max is monotone and every formula in G is in NNF, then G[/¬p1, . . . ,/¬pn] ≡max G.
Proof. To show that G[/¬p1, . . . ,/¬pn] ≡max G , it suﬃces to show for a single (ϕ,w) ∈ G that (G \ {(ϕ,w)}) ∪
{(ϕ[/¬p],w)} ≡max G , as we can then repeat the process for every other formula and every other p ∈ PS .
Fix a (ϕ,wϕ) ∈ G which has ¬p as a subformula. Suppose that no model M where p /∈ M is such that M |
 ϕ but
M ∪ {p} |
 ϕ . In this case, switching p from false to true will never make ϕ false if had been true, so we may safely replace
all occurrences of ¬p by . That is, |
 ϕ[/¬p] ↔ ϕ and we are done.
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Otherwise, let M be such a model. Since ϕ is in NNF, ϕ[/¬p] will remain true in every model where ϕ was true;
but there is additionally the possibility that M ∪ {p} |
 ϕ[/¬p] when M |
 ϕ . However, since uG,max is monotone and
M |
 ϕ , we know that uG,max(M ∪ {p}) wϕ , and so there must already be some (ψ,wψ) ∈ G such that M ∪ {p} |
 ψ and
wψ = uG,max(M ∪ {p}). Therefore, making it so that M ∪ {p} |
 ϕ[/¬p] will not disturb the value of the utility function
there (or in any other model). Hence, (G \ {(ϕ,w)})∪ {(ϕ[/¬p],w)} ≡max G . 
With this lemma in hand, we now improve on Theorem 13 and show that there is no succinctness gain from using
negation in arbitrary formulas, not just cubes, when representing monotone utility functions in max languages.
Theorem 45. If Φ is closed under transformation to NNF and for every G ∈ L(Φ,W ,max) which is in NNF, there exists a G[/¬p |
p ∈ PS] ∈ L(Ψ,W ′,max), then L(Φ,W ,max)  L(Ψ,W ′,max).
Proof. By Lemma 44, if G is in NNF, then G ≡max G[/¬p1, . . . ,/¬pn]. Since transformation to NNF and substitution of 
for all negative literals are both size-preserving, size(G) = size(G[/¬p1, . . . ,/¬pn]), so there is always a space-eﬃcient
translation from L(Φ,W ,max) to L(Ψ,W ′,max). 
Note that W ′ cannot be completely arbitrary here: The condition requiring that G[/¬p | p ∈ PS] ∈ L(Ψ,W ′,max)
implies that W ′ ⊇ W , though it is not stated in the theorem.
Corollary 46. L(forms,W ,max) ∼ L(pforms,W ′,max), for all W ,W ′ ⊆ R.
Proof. By Fact 40, we may assume without loss of generality that W = W ′ . Then it follows by inclusion that
L(forms,W ,max)  L(pforms,W ′,max), and L(forms,W ,max)  L(pforms,W ′,max) follows from Theorem 45. 
Our relative succinctness results are summarized in Table 1. The table contains many more results than are proved in the
text, but in all cases these are straightforward consequences of results which do appear here. The most common result by an
overwhelming margin is for two max languages to be equally succinct, a consequence of Theorem 41, which gives us equal
succinctness between any pair of cubes and pcubes languages. (For example, L(cubes,R+,max) ∼ L(pcubes,R,max).) All
differences in succinctness shown in the table are due to the combination of Theorem 42 with Fact 40 or Theorem 13. (See
the text immediately following Theorem 42 for the required argument.) Furthermore, we list no clauses languages here,
because Corollary 12 reduces all clauses languages to simpler cubes languages. Because our succinctness results for max
languages are much more powerful than comparable results for sum languages [10, Table 2], the table for max languages is
complete.
6.2. Cross-aggregator succinctness
Here we examine the succinctness of selected max languages with respect to selected sum languages. For any pair of
the 10 max languages and 18 sum languages considered in [10, Section 4], there is a succinctness result to be shown.
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unique representations we lack the tools to easily prove succinctness results involving them. The results we do present are
representative of results of this kind.
The ﬁrst two results, Theorems 48 and 49, indicate that each aggregator favors short representations for certain kinds of
utility functions; whether max or sum is better for a particular application will depend on what utility functions agents are
likely to have. Additionally, the ﬁnal three results in this section highlight why it was necessary to index our succinctness
relation to a particular class of comparison; a discussion of this appears at the end of the section.
We deﬁne two families of utility functions, u∀n and u∃n , which are useful for showing succinctness differences between
languages.
Deﬁnition 47. Let u∀n and u∃n be the utility functions over PSn where
u∀n(X) =
{




1 if X = ∅,
0 otherwise.
First, we use u∃n and a utility function with maximal range to compare L(pcubes,R+,max) with L(pcubes,R,). This
result highlights the difference between max and sum as aggregators.
Theorem 48. L(pcubes,R+,max) ⊥ L(pcubes,R,).
Proof. () The family u∃n was shown in the proof of [10, Theorem 4.11] to have exponential representations in
L(pcubes,R,). In L(pcubes,R+,max), u∃n is represented by G = {(p,1) | p ∈ PS}. Therefore L(pcubes,R+,max) 
L(pcubes,R,).
() Let un(X) = ∑ai∈X 2i . Then | ranun| = 2n , and so if Gmax represents un , then by Theorem 24, |Gmax|  2n . In
L(atoms,R+,), we have G = {(ai,2i) | 0 i < n} which represents un . Hence L(pcubes,R+,max)  L(pcubes,R,). 
We use u∀n to arrive at a similar result for L(pcubes,R+,max) and L(pclauses,R,):
Theorem 49. L(pcubes,R+,max) ⊥ L(pclauses,R,).
Proof. () The family u∀n was shown in the proof of [10, Theorem 4.10] to have exponential representations in the language
L(pclauses,R,). In L(pcubes,R+,max), u∀n is represented by {(
∧PS,1)}.
() Let un(X) = ∑ai∈X 2i . Then | ranun| = 2n , and so if Gmax represents un , then by Theorem 24, |Gmax|  2n . In
L(atoms,R+,), we have G = {(ai,2i) | 0 i < n} which represents un . Hence L(pcubes,R+,max)  L(pclauses,R,). 
The next two results are examples of how cross-aggregator succinctness may be surprising. The languages in question
have very little expressive overlap, which is the underlying reason for these results. First, we show that the austere language
L(atoms,R,max) is strictly more succinct than the seemingly-richer L(pcubes,R,):
Theorem 50. L(pcubes,R,) ≺ L(atoms,R,max).
Proof. U(atoms,R,max) corresponds to the class of unit-demand utility functions. Every unit-demand utility function u is
expressible linearly in the language L(atoms,R,max) as {(a,u(a))}a∈PS . In L(pcubes,R,) (which is fully expressive and
has uniqueness, cf. [10, Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.7]), u is represented by {(∧ X,w∧ X ) | X ⊆ PS} where
w∧ X = (−1)|X |+1 min
a∈X u(a).
For any unit-demand u which is also single-minded (i.e., exactly one a ∈ PS is such that u(a) = 0), it is the case that
G = {(a,u(a))}, the same as in L(atoms,R,max). For non-single-minded u, let X ⊆ PS be the items which u assigns
nonzero value. Then G will contain a nonzero weight for w∧ Y whenever Y ⊆ X . So, for the family u∃n , which is the family
of simple unit-demand utility functions, we have that representations in L(pcubes,R,) are exponential in |PS|. 
Next, we present a result similar to Theorem 50, but with the aggregators reversed. It may at ﬁrst seem surprising to ﬁnd
that there is a language with a natural deﬁnition which is strictly less succinct than the extremely limited L(atoms,R+,),
but we get this result because max languages are poor at representing modular utility functions.
Theorem 51. L(cubes,R+,max) ≺ L(atoms,R+,).
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functions. From Theorem 16, U(cubes,R+,max) is the class of nonnegative monotone utility functions, so L(atoms,R+,)
is the expressive intersection of the two languages. Every representation in L(atoms,R+,) is linear in |PS|. If u({a}) 0,
then the atom a will appear somewhere in any representation of u in L(cubes,R+,max), so no representations which grow
logarithmically in |PS| are possible there.
() Consider the family of utility functions u(X) = |X |. In L(atoms,R+,), u is represented by {(a,1) | X ∈ PS}, which
is linear in |PS|, while the unique representation in L(cubes,R+,max) is {(∧ X, |X |) | X ⊆ PS}, which is exponential
in |PS|. 
Finally, we compare L(pclauses,R,) and L(atoms,R,max). A feature of interest here is that we establish a succinctness
gap which falls below the discriminating power of our succinctness relation, since complex unit-demand valuations are
linearly representable in L(atoms,R,max), but the best representations of the same are quadratic in L(pclauses,R,).
Theorem 52. L(pclauses,R,) ∼ L(atoms,R,max).
Proof. Recall that U(atoms,R,max) is the class of unit-demand utility functions. Simple unit-demand utility functions are
expressible linearly in L(pclauses,R,) as {(∨PS,1)}. Consider complex unit-demand utility functions u (where items
may differ in value but the value of a bundle is the value of the best item contained in it) expressed in L(pclauses,R,).
Without loss of generality, suppose that the items are ordered a1  · · · an in value. Then{(∨
PS \ {a1, . . . ,ai−1},u(ai)− u(ai−1)
)}
1in
is the unique minimal representative of u in L(pclauses,R,), containing n(n−1)2 atoms. 
We are now in position to demonstrate why the more general deﬁnition of succinctness (subscripted by the comparison
class) is needed: In Theorem 50 we showed that L(pcubes,R,) ≺ L(atoms,R,max), while in Theorem 51, we showed that
L(cubes,R+,max) ≺ L(atoms,R+,). Furthermore, L(pcubes,R,) ∼ L(atoms,R+,), since the expressive intersection of
the two languages is the whole of the latter, and in the latter every representation is small. Finally, L(atoms,R,max) ∼
L(cubes,R+,max) because their expressive intersection is the class of nonnegative unit-demand utility functions, which
have small representations in both languages. We now have the following situation:
L(pcubes,R,) ≺ L(atoms,R,max)∼ ∼
L(atoms,R+,) # L(cubes,R+,max)
From this it can be seen that the unsubscripted succinctness relation is not transitive. This comes about because no two
pairs of these four languages have the same expressive intersection. Because the expressive intersection of the languages
can shift from comparison to comparison, we must make explicit the class of utility functions over which the comparison
is being made if we wish to do more than pairwise comparison.
7. The complexity of individual utility maximization and minimization
In this section, we analyze the effect that restrictions on goalbases have on the complexity of answering questions about
the utility functions they represent, focusing speciﬁcally on the decision problems max-util and min-util. The problem
max-util asks whether there is any model producing at least a speciﬁed amount of utility. The problem min-util is the
pessimal version of max-util, which asks whether an agent will always obtain at least some speciﬁed amount of utility, no
matter what model he ﬁnds himself in.
7.1. The complexity of max-util
The decision problem max-util is the problem of determining whether an agent, given his preferences, can attain at
least some speciﬁed amount of utility.
Deﬁnition 53 (The decision problem max-util). The decision problem max-util(Φ,W , F ) is deﬁned as: Given a goalbase
G ∈ L(Φ,W , F ) and an integer K , is there a model M ∈ 2PS where uG,F (M) K?
Note that we consider only cases where the set of weights W is a subset of Q, in order to avoid issues of how to
represent irrational weights.
Who (if anyone) needs to solve max-util depends on the context in which our preference representation languages are
being applied. Take auctions, for example: The Winner Determination Problem in combinatorial auctions [4] is the problem
of allocating goods to bidders while maximizing revenue. Whether max-util needs to be solved by the auctioneer in order
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is not necessary to solve max-util in order to solve the Winner Determination Problem, the complexity of max-util provides
a lower bound on how complex the Winner Determination Problem can be: Observe that in the (degenerate) single-bidder
case, the two problems coincide. If only one bidder shows up to the auction, then determining which items he wins is
precisely the same as ﬁnding his optimal model. Therefore, the Winner Determination Problem can never be easier than
max-util, as it contains max-util as a subproblem. Finally, for an agent himself it is useful to solve max-util if he builds
his bids not directly from an explicitly represented utility function, but instead from constraints or through elicitation. In
that case, the agent may only be able to ﬁnd his optimal model by ﬁrst solving max-util.
In contrast to the hardness results we have for max-util for most sum languages ([2, Section 5.5.1]; [10]), solving
max-util for any max language is trivial:
Theorem 54. max-util(forms,Q,max) ∈ TIME(n), when restricted to goalbases containing only satisﬁable formulas.
Proof. An algorithm solving max-util for any max language simply has to iterate over the formulas in the goalbase, answer
aﬃrmatively as soon as it encounters a (ϕ,w) for which w  K , and answer negatively otherwise. 
This complexity result requires some discussion. First, without the restriction to satisﬁable formulas,
max-util(forms,Q,max) is NP-complete, as lifting this restriction imposes the additional requirement of checking whether
ϕ is satisﬁable whenever w  K .7 Second (assuming that we retain the satisﬁability condition), we must be careful about
how we interpret the low complexity of max-util. Note that our algorithm does not compute the actual model M yielding
the desired level of utility; it only checks whether such an M exists. If we also require M itself, then we still need to extract
a satisfying model M from some goal (ϕ,w) where w  K .
The problem of ﬁnding a satisfying assignment for an arbitrary formula that is already known to be satisﬁable is probably
still intractable: fsat, which is the function problem version of sat, is complete for FNP, the extension of NP to function
problems. Given a formula ϕ , fsat will return either a satisfying model M , or “no” if there is no satisfying model. If we
somehow know already that ϕ is satisﬁable, then we know that fsat will always give us a model instead of answering “no”.
Call this subproblem of fsat where the input formulas are guaranteed to be satisﬁable tfsat (for “total” fsat). tfsat is a
member of the class TFNP, which is the subset of FNP where all problems are total—that is to say, these problems never
return “no” as an answer. Clearly, FP ⊆ TFNP ⊆ FNP, but no more beyond that is known. If FP = TFNP, this would imply
that P = NP ∩ coNP, which is considered unlikely [29]. Hence, it is likely that there is no polynomial algorithm for ﬁnding
a satisfying assignment for an arbitrary known-satisﬁable formula, so in general, the low complexity of max-util for max
languages does not imply low complexity of the corresponding function problem which ﬁnds a witness.
In contrast to this observation, for sum languages, we are not aware of any case where the complexity of checking
existence of an alternative giving at least K utility and computing that alternative differ, so long as we restrict ourselves to
languages closed under substitution of logical constants.8 For languages with an NP-complete max-util this is a non-issue;
for all sum languages with polynomial max-util the proofs are constructive and directly show the computation of the top
alternative to be polynomial.
Finally, we stress that both limitations of Theorem 54—the assumption that all goals are satisﬁable, and the difference for
L(forms,W ,max) between solving max-util and actually computing the best alternative—vanish for certain, more restricted
max languages. For both cubes and clauses (and any of their sublanguages) determining the satisﬁability of single formulas
is trivial; as a result, max-util(cubes,W ,max) and max-util(clauses,W ,max) are unconditionally in P. Finding a model for
a single satisﬁable cube or clause is also trivial, which makes computing the best alternative simple for these languages as
well.
7.2. The complexity of min-util
So far in this section, we have considered optimal models, but what of pessimal models? Just as an agent may wish to
know how well he can do, he may wish to know how poorly, as well. min-util can be seen as the pessimistic dual of the
optimistic max-util, in the sense that it checks lower bounds instead of upper bounds.
Deﬁnition 55 (The decision problem min-util). The decision problem min-util(Φ,W , F ) is deﬁned as: Given a goalbase G ∈
L(Φ,W , F ) and an integer K , are all models M ∈ 2PS such that uG,F (M) K?
(Note that min-util is not the complement of max-util: This can easily be seen from the problem instance 〈{(,1)},1〉,
which is a member of both decision problems, for many different languages and choices of aggregators.)
We have seen in [2, Section 5.5] that for sum languages, min-util behaves similarly to max-util. However, this is not the
case for max languages:
7 By taking satisﬁability as a precondition, we make max-util(forms,Q,max) into a promise problem, as discussed by Even et al. [28].
8 For languages which are not closed under substitution of logical constants, it is not always the case that the decision problem can be used to solve the
function problem. For a discussion of this, see [30] and [2, Section 5.7.1].
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for all (,w) ∈ G do
if  = pi and w  wˆi then
pˆi := 1, wˆi := w
else if  = ¬pi and w > wˆi then
pˆi := 0, wˆi := w
end if
end for
M := {pi ∈ PS | pˆi = 1}
Fig. 3. An algorithm for ﬁnding maximal optimal models for G ∈ L(literals,Q,max).
Theorem 56. min-util(forms,Q,max) is coNP-complete.
Proof. For coNP membership: Any purported counterexample model M is polynomially checkable, simply evaluating
uG,max(M) to see if it is less than K .
For coNP-hardness: Let ϕ be an instance of the well-known coNP-hard problem unsat, and 〈{(¬ϕ,1)},1〉 an instance of
min-util(forms,Q,max). It is easy to see that if ϕ is not satisﬁable, then u{(¬ϕ,1)}(M) = 1 for all models M , and vice versa.
Hence unsat reduces to min-util(forms,Q,max). 
If we restrict the goalbases in our inputs to those containing no superﬂuous formulas, however, we get a more favorable
result for min-util(forms,Q,max):
Theorem 57. min-util(forms,Q,max) ∈ TIME(n), when restricted to goalbases containing no superﬂuous formulas.
Proof. Since no (ϕ,w) ∈ G is superﬂuous, any such ϕ will determine the value of uG(M) for some model M . Hence, the
value of the worst model may be found simply by identifying the (ϕ,w) with the least w , which can be done by iterating
a single time over G . If that w  K , the min-util instance is positive, and negative otherwise. 
As with the sum languages over the same sets of formulas, there are some max languages for which min-util remains
polynomial in the absence of any further restrictions. This may be seen in the following three theorems.
Theorem 58. min-util(pforms,Q,max) ∈ TIME(n).
Proof. For any instance 〈G, K 〉, we know that uG is monotone. Hence, ∅ is a minimally-valued model. Therefore, 〈G, K 〉 ∈
min-util(pforms,Q,max) iff uG(∅) K , so all that is required to decide the instance is reading G once and comparing two
rationals. 
Theorem 59. min-util(literals,Q,max) ∈ TIME(n).
Proof. Let 〈G, K 〉 be an instance. We present in Fig. 3 a linear-time algorithm for building the maximal optimal model M
(maximal in the sense that, among all optimal models, it has the most true atoms). For each pi ∈ PS , wˆi tracks the value of
the best weighted literal containing pi seen so far, while pˆi tracks whether that literal was positive or negative. Because M
is the maximal optimal model, it follows that PS \M is the minimal pessimal model, since the values of items are mutually
independent in uG . Finally, we check whether uG(PS \ M) K . 
Theorem 60. min-util(cubes,Q,max) ∈ TIME(n2).
Proof. We argue that it is quadratic to identify and remove superﬂuous formulas from goalbases in L(cubes,Q,max); once
G contains no superﬂuous formulas, we may invoke Theorem 57 to ﬁnish deciding the reduced instance.














⇐⇒ X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y , or X ∩ Y = ∅.
That is to say, testing whether one cube implies another involves only checking whether some sets intersect or are supersets
of some other sets, all of which are O (n logn) operations. This means we can ﬁnd and remove superﬂuous cubes from any
G ∈ L(cubes,Q,max) as follows:
For each pair of cubes (
∧
X ∧∧¬Y ,w), (∧ X ′ ∧∧¬Y ′,w ′) ∈ G , if w ′ > w and either X ′ ⊆ X and Y ′ ⊆ Y or X ∩ Y = ∅,
then (
∧
X ∧∧¬Y ,w) is superﬂuous; remove it from G .
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Summary of complexity results for max-util and min-util.
Decision problem Complexity
max-util forms Q max TIME(n)
min-util pforms Q max TIME(n)
min-util literals Q max TIME(n)
min-util cubes Q max TIME(n2)
min-util forms Q max coNP-complete
This algorithm is quadratic in |G|. Once G contains no superﬂuous formulas, the least remaining weight w may be found
and checked for whether w  K . 
It is worth noting the dramatic difference the choice of aggregator makes for min-util over cubes languages: From [2,
Theorem 5.5.21], we have that min-util is already coNP-complete for positively-weighted 2-cubes using summation, while
here we have shown that min-util for arbitrarily-weighted cubes of any length remains polynomial when aggregating with
max.
Theorem 54 shows that max-util is linear for all max languages (when only satisﬁable formulas are given as input).
The general case of min-util is surprisingly hard, being coNP-complete. The full language L(forms,Q,max) is perhaps more
suitable for optimists interested in how much utility they may hope to achieve, rather than pessimists interested in how
much utility they are guaranteed. On the other hand, as there is no difference in expressivity between L(cubes,Q,max) and
L(forms,Q,max) (see Corollary 12), nothing compels us to use the additional formulas we gain by permitting disjunction;
and in fact it seems that we are punished with additional complexity for using disjunction in this case. See Table 2 for a
summary of results for max-util and min-util.
8. The complexity of collective utility maximization
Collective utility maximization is the central problem we face when attempting to allocate indivisible goods among
a group of agents. The goal may range from maximizing revenue, as with auctions (or minimizing cost, as with reverse
auctions), to maximizing overall satisfaction, as with task allocation. Determining how to use the limited capabilities of a
satellite to satisfy each space agency which contributed to its cost [31,32]; selling ﬂowers or bonds to bidders at auction;
assigning radio spectra to communications operators, routes to bus operators [33], and take-off and landing slots to airlines
[34]—all of these are resource allocation problems where we want to maximize collective utility according to some measure.
When there are several agents, each with a utility function encoded using the same language, then the collective utility
maximization problem (max-cuf), the problem of ﬁnding a solution maximizing collective utility, is of interest. By “solution”
we mean a partition of the set of propositional variables among the agents, thereby ﬁxing a model for each of them. This
deﬁnition is natural, for instance, if we think of variables as goods.9 (For example, if there are three goods a,b, c and two
agents 1,2, then one possible allocation is to assign goods a and b to agent 1 and good c to agent 2.) In this section, we
focus on the complexity of max-cuf for several max languages and notions of collective utility.
Now, we introduce the deﬁnitions we need for discussing collective utility maximization. A collective utility function
(CUF) [13] fulﬁlls the same role for groups of agents as the aggregation function does for individuals, viz., mapping multiple
utilities to a single, aggregated value:
Deﬁnition 61 (Collective utility functions). A collective utility function (CUF) is a mapping σ :R∗ → R.
Since any function from tuples of reals to reals is a CUF, there are a great diversity of CUFs from which to choose [13].
In practice, however the four CUFs most frequently encountered are the egalitarian, utilitarian, elitist, and Nash product
collective utility functions:
Deﬁnition 62 (Common collective utility functions).
• σ =max is the elitist collective utility function.
• σ =min is the egalitarian collective utility function.
• σ =  is the utilitarian collective utility function.
• σ = 
 is the Nash product collective utility function.
The utilitarian collective utility of an alternative is the sum of the individual utilities. Optimizing with respect to utilitar-
ian collective utility is equivalent to the Winner Determination Problem in combinatorial auctions, where it is interpreted as
9 Other types of solutions, such as ﬁnding a single model which maximizes collective utility, are also of interest, but shall not be considered here. The
combinatorial vote problem of Lang [26] is exactly this problem, in the context of voting.
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CUFs are similar, but focus on different individuals as salient for collective utility: The egalitarian collective utility is the
utility of the agent worst off, while the elitist collective utility is the utility of the agent best off. (A ﬁner-grained version of
egalitarian collective utility, the leximin ordering was advocated by Rawls [36]; another possibility is to focus on the utility of
some agent other than the best or worst off, for example, the median agent, as the median-rank dictator CUF does.) Finally,
the Nash product, the product of individual utilities, attempts to strike a balance between fairness and total utility.10
Now we give a formal deﬁnition of max-cuf, which is similar to the deﬁnition of max-util, but lifted from an individual
agent to a group of agents:
Deﬁnition 63 (The decision problem max-cuf). The decision problem max-cuf(Φ,W , F , σ ) for n agents is deﬁned as: Given
goalbases G1, . . . ,Gn ∈ L(Φ,W , F ), a collective utility function σ , and an integer K , is there a partition 〈M1, . . . ,Mn〉 of PS
such that σ(uG1,F (M1), . . . ,uGn,F (Mn)) K?
First, we state two lemmas bounding the complexity of max-cuf:
Lemma 64. max-cuf(Φ,W , F , σ ) ∈ NP whenever F and σ are polynomially-computable functions.
This holds because whenever F and σ are polynomially-computable functions, we can in all cases easily check whether
a given allocation does in fact produce at least K utility.
Before proceeding to our next lemma, we need to deﬁne a reasonableness notion for individual and collective utility
functions.
Deﬁnition 65 (Singleton consistency). A function f :R∗ → R without ﬁxed arity is singleton consistent if f (α) = α for all
α ∈ R.
Any reasonable individual aggregator or collective utility function will be singleton consistent. For individual aggregators,
singleton consistency means that an agent having exactly one satisﬁed weighted formula (ϕ,w) has utility w . For collective
utility functions, singleton consistency means that a single-agent society has the same utility as its sole member. Singleton
consistent functions give the intuitively right answers for the utility of single agents stranded on desert islands. All of the
functions we consider here—min, max, sum, and product—are singleton consistent.
Lemma 66. max-cuf(Φ,W , F , σ ) is at least as hard as max-util(Φ,W , F ) for any singleton-consistent σ .
Here, singleton consistency ensures that σ behaves as the identity function when only a single agent is involved, and
hence for such σ max-cuf and max-util coincide.
max-cuf is easy for max languages when using the elitist collective utility function, for the same reasons as those stated
in support of Theorem 54.
Fact 67. max-cuf(forms,Q,max,max) ∈ TIME(n) so long as goalbases contain only satisﬁable formulas.
However, when we switch to other common CUFs, max-cuf becomes hard even for severely restricted languages:
Theorem 68. max-cuf(2-pcubes, {0,1},max, σ ) is NP-complete for σ ∈ {,
,min}.
Proof. For the ﬁrst case, σ = , we follow van Hoesel and Müller [37, Theorem 2] by reducing the known NP-complete
problem tripartite matching [38] to max-cuf(2-pcubes, {0,1},max,). Instances of tripartite matching are 〈X, Y , Z , T 〉,
where the sets X, Y , Z are such that |X | = |Y | = |Z | and T ⊆ X × Y × Z . An instance 〈X, Y , Z , T 〉 is a member iff there is an
M ⊆ T which is a perfect matching (i.e., each x ∈ X , y ∈ Y , and z ∈ Z appears in exactly one triple in M).
For the reduction, we interpret the set X as agents and the sets Y and Z as items appearing in 2-pcubes. For each
(x, y, z) ∈ T , put (y ∧ z,1) ∈ Gx . Also put (,0) ∈ Gx . Let K = |X |. The only way to achieve K utility by allocating Y ∪ Z
to the agents in X is to ensure that at least one (non-) goal is satisﬁed from each Gx; conversely, satisfying more than
one (non-) goal in any Gx does not increase collective utility, since the individual aggregator is max. Hence 〈X, Y , Z , T 〉 ∈
tripartite matching iff 〈{Gx}x∈X , |X |〉 ∈max-cuf(2-spcubes, {0,1},max,).
For the other cases, use the same reduction from tripartite matching but let K = 1. 
10 Note that all of the collective utility functions we consider are associative and commutative, so aggregating a tuple of individual utilities is the same as
aggregating a multiset of individual utilities. Functions which are nonassociative or noncommutative tend to be less interesting as CUFs, because they fail
to treat all agents equally.
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Summary of complexity results for max-cuf.
Decision problem Complexity
max-cuf satisﬁable ϕ Q max max TIME(n)
max-cuf 2-spcubes {1} max  NP-complete
max-cuf 2-spcubes {1} max min NP-complete
max-cuf 2-pcubes {0,1} max 
 NP-complete
This result subsumes parts of the NP-completeness results of Bouveret et al. [39, Fig. 1] and Bouveret [40, Propo-
sition 4.22] for σ = min. As they do not consider negation, their results (by a reduction from set packing) apply to
max-cuf(pforms,Q,max,min), which contains the problem max-cuf(2-spcubes, {0,1},max,min) that we have just proved
to be NP-complete. Notice also that the presence of (,0) in each goalbase is necessary only in the σ = 
 case.11 For the
other two cases including (,0) is safe but unnecessary; for  and min we could state a slightly stronger result using only
2-spcubes and W = {1}, leaving the proof otherwise unchanged.
max-cuf is signiﬁcantly harder than max-util. There are numerous languages for which max-util is polynomial, but
where max-cuf is NP-complete for some collective utility function. For example, Theorem 68 shows that a tiny fragment of
a language with positive formulas and positive weights already has an NP-complete max-cuf problem, despite that max-util
is trivial over the same languages. See Table 3 for a summary of results for max-cuf.
9. Conclusions and future work
We have analyzed the expressivity, succinctness and complexity of languages for representing utility functions that are
based on weighted propositional formulas aggregated by the max operator. Our results show that there are substantial
differences in all three categories in comparison with languages using sum for aggregating weights [10].
For expressivity, we were able to give a complete picture for the most important languages, in part because the inclusion
of disjunction in max languages has no effect on expressivity, which cuts down the number of languages to consider.
More ﬁne-grained results could probably still be obtained by considering languages generated by speciﬁc weight sets or by
looking into formulas of limited length (although in some cases such results will be direct consequences of what is known
already). Concerning relative succinctness, we have established all relationships between the max languages we consider,
and have also given several results that show how they relate to selected sum languages. Additionally, we have exhibited
bounds on the absolute succinctness of max-aggregated goalbases formed using cubes and positive cubes. Lastly, concerning
complexity: We have observed that ﬁnding an alternative maximizing individual utility (max-util) is computationally easy
for max languages for all practical purposes, while ﬁnding an alternative minimizing individual utility (min-util) ranges
from linear to coNP-complete, depending on which formulas the language allows. We have then discussed to what extent
known results apply to our framework when analyzing the complexity of the problem of maximizing collective utility for
a group of agents (max-cuf), and proved NP-completeness results for collective utility maximization in several restrictive
languages.
Some problems remain open. As mentioned before, we do not know the exact expressivity of the max languages with
bounded formula length (L(k-cubes,R,max) and its positive sublanguages, for 1 < k < ω), and many cross-aggregator suc-
cinctness results are still unresolved. The bounds on goalbase size for L(cubes,R,max) are not tight in all cases, and could
be improved. Also of interest is sharpening the boundary between the languages for which max-cuf is NP-complete and
those for which it is only polynomial—for example, when using the Nash product as the collective utility function, how little
expressive power may we remove from L(2-spcubes, {0,1},max) before its max-cuf problem becomes easier, or how much
may we add to L(atoms, {0,1},max) before its max-cuf becomes harder?
Finally, there looms the larger question of whether the properties goalbase languages have by virtue of their aggregators
may be tackled in a more general way, rather than by doing once for each aggregator the painstaking classiﬁcation work
done here for max and in [10] for . Unfortunately, max and  differ enough that we do not yet see how to generalize
over them; perhaps it would be easier to generalize over max and min, or  and 
, as these pairs of aggregators have
more in common than max and  do.
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